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ABSTRACT: Responding to a high fiscal 
deficit, the Serbian government introduced 
a set of fiscal consolidation measures at the 
beginning of 2015, including a 10% public 
sector wage cut. This paper analyses the dif-
ference in wages between the public and the 
private sector in Serbia and changes in the 
public sector wage premium after the mea-
sures were introduced. The results show 
that, similarly to many other countries, 
wages in the Serbian public sector are on 
average higher than in the private sector, 
partially due to the better labour market 
characteristics of public sector workers. The 
public sector wage premium was 17.4% in 
2014 and was mainly driven by higher re-
turns to education, work experience, and 
occupation in this sector. In 2015 the pre-
mium dropped by 6 percentage points due 
to a lessening of the difference in returns 
between the sectors. Therefore, in addition 
to reducing budget expenditures, fiscal con-
solidation in Serbia has reduced wage in-
equality between these sectors.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the majority of European countries, wages in the public sector are on average 
higher than wages in the private sector (European Commission 2014). This 
difference, i.e., the unadjusted pay gap between public and private sectors, is 
partly due to differences in the labour market characteristics between the 
sectors, since public sector workers typically have higher levels of education, 
longer tenure, etc. As these characteristics are valued more by the employer, the 
better labour market characteristics of public sector workers partly account for 
the difference in wages.  
The use of individual micro-level data and statistical techniques allows us to 
control for differences in characteristics and to calculate the difference in wages 
between the sectors for the same job, i.e., to estimate the public sector wage 
premium. According to recent research by the European Commission (2014), 
the average EU public sector wage premium is estimated to be 3.6%.1 This 
means that even when differences in workers’ labour market characteristics are 
statistically controlled for, public sector wages are, on average, higher. The 
European Commission’s research further shows that there is large variability 
across countries, with some countries having positive and some negative public 
sector wage premiums.2  
In most transition countries, public sector wages were, ceteris paribus, lower 
than private sector wages at the beginning of the transition, but as the transition 
unfolded they reached the same level or became higher (Laušev 2014). In Serbia 
these trends were even more pronounced, as the distinctly negative public sector 
wage premium from the 1990s was replaced by a high positive premium in the 
2010s (Vladisavljević et al. 2017). 
The public sector wage premium has been of particular importance in recent 
years, when due to the economic crisis and large public debt a number of 
countries decided to reduce their public expenditure by implementing austerity 
                                                            
1  The research was based on Structure of Earnings Survey data for all EU27 countries except 
Sweden.  
2  According to the same study, the size of the public sector wage premium is negatively 
correlated with the size of the public sector via the monopsonic role of the state in wage 
formation and job security in the private sector, as higher job security in the private sector 
requires stronger monetary compensation in the public sector. Since the focus of this paper is 
on the effects of fiscal consolidation we do not discuss these factors in detail here. For further 
discussion see Vladisavljević et al. (2017). 
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(fiscal consolidation) measures. Reduction of public sector salaries was 
considered less harmful to the countries' general economic performance than 
reduction of other public expenditure items such as public investment (de 
Castro et al. 2013), and higher wages in the public sector were often used as an 
additional argument that the wage cut was justified, not only from the 
perspective of efficiency but also from the perspective of equity.  
In Serbia in 2014 the fiscal deficit stood at 6.6% of GDP and was among the 
highest in Europe, which is why at the end of 2014 the government introduced a 
fiscal consolidation programme. The programme included a 10% reduction in 
public sector wages higher than RSD 25,0003 (for a full-time job) as of 
November 2014 (Republic of Serbia 2014), thus protecting public sector workers 
with the lowest wages. At the same time, the ‘solidarity tax’ (Republic of Serbia 
2013) on the highest wages (over RSD 60,000) ceased to exist to avoid a double 
tax increase on the highest wages. Fiscal consolidation also imposed a public 
sector wage freeze until the end of 2017.4 The programme also cut pensions 
(above the minimum pension level) and announced rationalization of the 
number of employees. 
According to a recent study (Vladisavljević 2016) that investigates wage trends 
in public administration and the manufacturing sector (sectors dominated by 
public and private ownership, respectively), the fiscal consolidation programme 
decreased the unadjusted wage gap between these two sectors. The unadjusted 
gap in wages between the sectors, which stood at 27.5%, on average, in 2014, 
dropped to 14.6% in 2015, and then continued to fall.  
However, as mentioned before, changes in the unadjusted wage gap can be 
affected by changes in employment structure within the sectors. Therefore, the 
aim of this paper is to investigate the changes in the public sector wage 
premium trends in Serbia that occurred after the fiscal consolidation measures. 
We estimate the public sector wage premium in Serbia using Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) data from 2014, before the fiscal consolidation measures were 
implemented, and from 2015, after the measures were introduced. In order to 
estimate the public sector wage premium we use a Mincer-type wage equation 
                                                            
3  In Serbia in 2014 the minimum wage for a full-time job was around RSD 20,000, while a wage 
of RSD 25,000 represented the start of the second decile in the distribution of public wages, 
according to LFS data. 
4  However, at the beginning of 2016 and again in 2017, the government approved increases in 
public sector wages by varying amounts depending on the sector of activity. 
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(Mincer 1974) and the frequently used Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder 
1973; Oaxaca 1973).  
The paper is structured as followed. After the introduction, in the next section 
we review the literature on the public sector wage premium in transition 
countries with a special focus on previous research for Serbia. In section three 
we introduce the data that will be used in this paper. The fourth section deals 
with descriptive evidence of employment and wage trends before and after the 
fiscal consolidation. In section five we present the methodology that will be used 
to estimate the changes in the public sector wage premium in Serbia between 
2014 and 2015, and in section six we present the results of our estimates. Section 
seven concludes. 
2. THE PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE PREMIUM IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES  
AND SERBIA 
In the developed economies, regardless of the estimation method, the public 
sector wage premium is usually estimated to be around zero or positive (e.g., 
Ghinetti 2007; Bargain & Melly 2008; Giordano et al. 2011; de Castro et al. 
2013). Numerous factors contribute to the positive public sector wage premium 
in developed economies, such as political decisions that influence the wage-
setting process in the public sector, higher trade union participation in the 
public sector, etc. (Giordano et al. 2011).  
In countries in transition from a socialist to a market economy it was the private 
rather than the public sector that usually paid ceteris paribus higher wages at the 
beginning of the transition, (Laušev 2014). Adamčik and Bedi (2000) argue that 
one of the reasons for the lower public sector wages at the beginning of the 
transition was fiscal and inflationary pressure on these countries’ budgets. 
According to Brainerd (2002), the reasons behind the higher private sector 
wages were lower job security and employers’ desire to motivate their workers 
when starting new companies, so that they paid ‘effective’ wages. Additional 
factors contributing to lower wages in the public sector were privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises and increased migration possibilities. Both processes 
led to disproportionally high transitions of high-paid qualified workers from the 
public sector as they opted for higher wages in the private sector or abroad 
(Lausev 2014).  
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However, as the transition unfolded the wages in the public sector became equal 
to or even higher than those in the private sector. Laušev (2014) provides an 
excellent review of the papers that estimate public-private wage differences in 
the Eastern European economies. She reports that at the beginning of the 
transition the wages in transition countries’ public sectors were on average 20% 
lower than in the private sector, while at the end of the transition the difference 
was not statistically significant. Furthermore, in almost all empirical studies the 
advantage of the private sector disappears after the economic transition. Laušev 
(2014) concludes that the market mechanisms that are responsible for the 
positive public sector wage premiums in developed economies took over as the 
impact of transition mechanisms started to fade. 
The public sector wage premium in Serbia 
In one of the first papers that investigated public-private wage differences in 
Serbia, Jovanovic and Lokshin (2003) found a negative public sector wage 
premium of 9.4% for men and 4% for women, using Labour Force Survey data 
from 2000. According to the authors the higher wages in the private sector were 
due to higher non-wage benefits and higher job security in the public sector. In 
other words, in order to compete for workers with the public sector, the private 
sector had to offer higher wages to compensate for less favourable working 
conditions (Jovanovic and Lokshin 2003). 
Krstić, Litchfield, and Reilly (2007) also use Labour Force Survey data to 
investigate male wage inequality in Serbia. Their results suggest that between 
1995 and 2003 the negative public sector wage premium for men was reduced 
from 28.5% to 8%. The authors attribute this result to a decrease in overall wage 
inequality due to the minimum wage reform, and to formalization of the private 
sector, which lowered differences in job security between the sectors.  
According to Laušev (2012), in the period between 2004 and 2008 the public 
sector wage premium went from zero to positive for workers with low 
education, and from negative to positive for workers with high education. The 
reason behind the public sector wage premium increase during the 2000s seems 
to be an exaggerated increase in public wages. The increase has been assessed as 
fiscally irresponsible, although at first motivated by “good intentions” 
(Arandarenko 2011).  
Latest estimates, based on data from the Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions (SILC) from 2013, suggest a very high public sector wage premium 
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of 17.2% (Vladisavljević & Jovančević 2016). A recent review of public–private 
wage differences in Western Balkan countries (Vladisavljević et al. 2017) 
suggests that the level of public sector wages in Serbia differs across activity 
sectors. Compared to trends in OECD countries, the ratio of the average sector 
wage to average country wage is low in the education and health sectors and 
medium in public administration. Recent evidence suggests that due to better 
working conditions in the public sector (better job security, shorter working 
hours, higher levels of job satisfaction, etc.) the public sector wage premium in 
Serbia created a strong public–private duality in the Serbian labour market 
(Vladisavljević 2017). On the other hand, most jobs in the private sector are 
characterized by lower job security and lower wages, and a difficult transition to 
the primary labour market (Arandarenko 2011). 
3. DATA 
To analyse employment and wage trends in 2014 and 2015 and to estimate the 
changes in the public sector wage premium we use Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
data. The survey, conducted on a quarterly basis by the Statistical Office of the 
Republic of Serbia (SORS), provides nationally and regionally representative 
data on the labour market in Serbia5 and is the essential instrument for assessing 
key labour market indicators (employment rate, unemployment, and inactivity) 
in Serbia, as well as in the European Union (according to Eurostat). The data 
includes weights, calculated by the SORS, to correct the descriptive statistics and 
econometric estimates of the probability that a household is selected into the 
sample from a population of Serbian households. 
The sample for each quarter consists of five rotating groups that are 
independent subsamples, and each subsample is representative of the whole 
population. The rotation panel is introduced in order to ensure comparability of 
the results between waves. Each of the subsamples rotates based on the 2–2–2 
system, according to which each subsample is first selected into the sample for 
two waves, than is out of the sample for two waves, and then once again twice 
selected into the sample.  
                                                            
5  According to the SORS, the target population is “Households and persons referring to the 
usual population that reside in the territory of the Republic of Serbia without the Region of 
Kosovo and Metohia. Excluded are persons in collective households (students’ and pupils’ 
dormitories, homes for children and youth with disabilities, homes for socially vulnerable 
children, homes for pensioners, retirement nursing homes care, homes for adult disabled 
persons, monasteries etc.)”. 
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The LFS provides the only data which includes all the information necessary to 
analyse the public sector wage premium: monthly wages, sector of ownership, 
demographic and other workers’ characteristics (gender, age, education, etc.), 
job characteristics (hours worked, occupation, sectors of activity, etc.), and 
regional and household identifiers. The dependent variable in the analysis is the 
hourly wage, calculated using the information on monthly wage and usual 
weekly working hours during a ‘normal’ week.  
The sample for the analysis does not include the self-employed, as their wages 
are not registered in the LFS. Additionally, as a standard approach in the 
literature, we exclude the informally employed,6 farmers, and occasional and 
seasonal workers, as their wages are not comparable to those of formal salary 
workers. We further restrict the sample by excluding persons in education, 
those working below 16 hours per week, those refusing to report their wages or 
reporting zero wages,7 and those whose sector of ownership is ‘other’,8 and by 
including only individuals aged 20–64. Finally, we drop the respondents who 
fall within the top or bottom 1% of the hourly wage distribution and whose 
wages would have an exaggerated influence on the regression estimations 
(Cameron & Trivedi 2010, p. 96).  
The total sample for the analysis comprises 32,698 respondents, 17,322 working 
in the private sector and 15,376 working in the public sector. The dependent 
variable in all econometric analyses is hourly wages, calculated based on 
monthly wages and usual hours worked.9  
                                                            
6  According to the official definition given by the SORS that we also use in this paper, informal 
employment includes unpaid family members, persons working in unregistered businesses, 
and persons working in registered businesses but without formal contracts and without 
paying pension and social security contributions. 
7  In 16.4% of the cases, respondents refused to give any information about wages and in 1.9% 
of the cases the respondents reported zero wages. 
8  The main independent variable, sector of ownership, is based on the question, “What type of 
ownership do you work under?” and is not available in alternative datasets such as EU-SILC. 
Respondents answer the question by choosing from four alternatives: “Private-registered”, 
“Private-unregistered”, “Public”, and “Other”. In the analysis we drop “Private-unregistered” 
employees as they are informally employed, and “Other” as the ownership of the business 
does not belong to either of the groups. 
9  The LFS contains both usual and actual working hours. According to the LFS questionnaire, 
actual working hours refers to the hours worked in the observed (last) week, while wages 
refer to monthly income. Since the actual (i.e., weekly) working hours might be subject to 
weekly fluctuations, we opted to use the usual working hours to compute hourly wages. 
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4. EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE TRENDS BEFORE AND  
AFTER THE FISCAL CONSOLIDATION 
4.1. Employment trends 
Public sector employees in Serbia represent a large share of the total 
employment in the country. According to the LFS data (Table 1), public sector 
workers represent about one-third of total employment in Serbia, one of the 
highest shares in Europe (Vladisavljević et al. 2017). In 2014 the estimated 
number of public sector workers was 764,127 (29.9%), which decreased to 
729,828 (28.3%) in 2015. At the same time the total number of workers in the 
private sector in Serbia increased by approximately 40,000 employees (from 
1,744,477 to 1,785,324).  
The weighted share of the public sector workers in the estimation sample of 
about 45% (Table 1) is higher than that reported in the official statistics (and in 
the ‘Total sample’ column in Table 1) due to the fact that many sample 
restrictions apply almost exclusively to workers from the private sector (self-
employed, unpaid family members, informal employment, etc.). The trends of 
the estimation sample correspond to the trends of the total sample: the number 
of employees in the private sector is increasing, while the number of employees 
in the public sector is decreasing.  
Table 1: Number of employed by sector of ownership in 2014 and 2015  
Total sample Estimation sample 
2014 2015 Change 2014 2015 Change 
Total 2,559,441 2,574,159 14,718 1,167,596 1,174,476 6,880 
Private sector  1,744,477 1,785,324 40,847 607,682 643,205 35,522 
Public sector  764,127 729,828 –34,299 559,914 531,271 –28,643 
Source: Author's calculation based on LFS data (weighted sub-samples).  
Notes: Workers who state that their sector of ownership is ‘private-unregistered’ or ‘other’ are 
excluded from the table and the analysis of wage trends.  
Table A1 in the Appendix presents basic descriptive data on private and public 
sector workers. Compared to the private sector, workers in the public sector are 
more likely to be female, married, older (and with longer working experience), 
and to live in urban areas, in Belgrade, and in East Serbia. They are on average 
better educated than workers in the private sector, with a significantly higher 
share of workers with tertiary education (35.2% vs. 16.7%). Educational 
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differences are also reflected in the occupational structure, as public sector 
workers are more frequently in better-paid ISCO occupation groups such as 
Managers (ISCO group 1), Professionals (ISCO 2), Technicians (ISCO 3) or 
Clerks (ISCO 4), however, they also have a higher share of workers in 
elementary occupations (ISCO 9). In both groups the share of part-time workers 
is negligible (below 2%), while the share of temporary contracts is significantly 
higher in the private sector (15.4% vs. 8.2% in the public sector), indicating 
higher job security in the public sector.  
The educational and occupational structure of private sector workers has not 
changed over the years, indicating that new workers in the private sector come 
from all educational levels and occupations. However, the share of temporary 
workers in the private sector has increased significantly (from 15.4% to 19.3%), 
indicating that most new workers are employed on temporary contracts.10 On 
the other hand, the decrease in public sector workers is mainly due to the lower 
number of people with two or three years of secondary education (Table A1 in 
Appendix), therefore on average improving the educational structure of the 
public sector. 
4.2. Wage differences between the sectors 
Table 2 presents monthly and hourly wages and average usual working hours in 
2014 and 2015. In 2014, hourly wages in the public sector were about 39% 
higher than in the private sector, as the result of both higher monthly wages (by 
30.2%) and lower average working hours in the public sector (by 7.3%). 
Table 2: Average wages and working hours by sector in 2014 and 2015  
 Monthly wage 
(in RSD) 
Working hours Hourly wage (in RSD) 
 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 Change 
Private 29,634 30,449 44.1 44.1 149.1 153.2 2.8% 
Public 38,576 37,911 40.9 40.8 206.9 203.1 –1.9% 
Public vs. private 30.2% 24.5% –7.3% –7.4% 38.8% 32.5% 6.3pp 
Source: Author's calculation based on LFS data (weighted sub-samples).  
                                                            
10  This is in line with changes in the Labour Law, according to which fixed-term contracts can 
last up to three years instead of one. 
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In 2015, hourly wages in the private sector grew by 2.8%, while, due to fiscal 
consolidation, wages in the public sector fell by –1.9%, so that the gap between 
the sectors decreased to 32.5%. The decrease in public sector wages is in 
accordance with the wage cut introduced as part of the fiscal consolidation 
measures. The fact that the decrease is lower than the cut (which was set at 10%) 
is partly the consequence of the fact that low wages are protected by the reform 
and partly due to changes in the structure of employment. In the next chapter 
we introduce econometric techniques to account for these factors. 
5. ESTIMATION OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE DIFFERENTIAL 
We estimate the public sector wage premium for 2014 and 2015 by using 
regression analysis and Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 
1973). In order to estimate public sector wage differences we regress the log 
hourly wages on the public sector dummy and X-vector of other individual 
(gender, age, settlement, region, education) and job (working experience, 
occupation, part-time and temporary work) characteristics, while � is a vector 
of the unknown equation parameters to be estimated. 
� � ����� � � � �������������� � ��� � �� ,  (1) 
Coefficient � in Equation (1) is then an estimate of the public sector wage 
premium. If we do not control for other individual and job characteristics in our 
regression analysis, � is equal to the unadjusted gap in wages between the public 
and private sector. 
In order to perform the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition we estimate separate 
equations for the public and private sector:  
���� � ��������� � ����  – for the public sector (2a) 
���� � ��������� � ���� – for the private sector (2b) 
The difference in means between the sectors can, after transformations, be 
decomposed into two parts (Jann 2008): 
���� � ���� � � ����� � ��������∗ � ������������ � ��∗� � ��������∗ � ������� (2c) 
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The first part of the right side of Equation (2c), ������ � ����������∗ , represents 
the explained part (or the composition or quantity effect), which is due to 
differences in individual and job characteristics between the sectors, while the 
second part of the right side of Equation (2c), ������������� � ��∗� �
���������∗ � �������, represents the unexplained part of the gap, which is due to 
differences in returns to characteristics and to unobservable differences (Jann 
2008). 
It can be shown that if for the reference coefficients ��∗ in Equation (2c) we use 
estimates from the pooled model in which the public sector dummy is included, 
i.e., Equation (1), the unexplained part of the gap is equal to the � coefficient 
from Equation (1); i.e., the unexplained part of the gap is another estimate of the 
public sector wage premium.  
Bearing in mind the above notion, the main advantage of using Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition is that it enables us to further decompose the explained part and 
the unexplained part of the contribution of each of the covariates (Avlijaš et al. 
2013). The explained part in fact represents a simple sum of individual 
differences in each of the k labour market characteristics:  
����� � ��������∗ � 	 ������� � ����������∗ � ������� � ����������∗ � �� ������� � ����������∗, (2d) 
Similarly, the unexplained part represents the sum of differences in intercepts 
(���) and differences in returns to each of the k labour market characteristics: 
������������ � ��∗� � ��������∗ � �������
� 	 ������� � ������� � �������������� � ���∗� � ����������∗ � �������� 	� �������������� � ���∗� � ����������∗ � �������� � �	� �������������� � ���∗� � ����������∗ � �������� 
 (2e). 
The difference between the private and public sector intercepts can be attributed 
to unobserved differences between the sectors, while the difference in returns to 
characteristics represent the ‘real’ inequality between the sectors; i.e., the fact 
that one sector pays for certain characteristics more or less than the other 
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sector.11 Therefore the difference in returns indicates the differences in rewards 
of the labour market characteristics that lie behind the public sector wage 
premium. 
The robustness of the results at mean is checked by using another 
decomposition method, John, Murphy, and Peirce (JMP) (John, Murphy, and 
Peirce 1991).12 JMP decomposition accounts for the fact that wage distribution 
in sectors can be different and splits the gap into three parts: differences in 
observable quantities (Q), differences in observable prices (P, i.e., the estimate of 
the public sector wage premium), and differences in unobservable quantities 
and prices (U). The first two are equivalent to the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition's explained and unexplained parts, while the last part is 
computed by comparing the percentiles of the wage distributions in the public 
and the private sector.  
6. RESULTS 
Table A2 in the Appendix presents the estimations of wage Equation (1) 
separately for 2014 and 2015. The results show the expected signs of all wage 
determinants. For both years, wages are, ceteris paribus, higher for men than for 
women; higher for workers with higher levels of education, longer working 
experience, and in better-paid occupations; higher for part-time workers, 
compared to full-time workers; and higher for workers with permanent 
contracts compared to temporary workers. Also, wages are, in accordance with 
expectations, higher in Belgrade than in other regions, as well as for workers 
from urban compared to rural settlements. Finally, negative returns for age 
(with working experience also included in the specification) indicate lower 
wages for older workers with the same level of working experience.  
We now turn to the main focus of our analysis, wage differences between public 
and private sectors. The coefficients in the first part of Table A1 indicate a positive 
                                                            
11  This distinction is made in many papers, many of which deal with the gender wage gap rather 
than the public sector wage premium (e.g., Busch and Holst 2009). This approach is a 
simplified version of other approaches that deal with the effects of unobservables on the 
public sector wage premium, which is beyond the scope of this paper (e.g., Heckman 
selection correction approach). 
12  As we use this method only for robustness checks, we do not present the method in full 
detail, but rather in intuitive fashion. For full details of JMP decomposition see the quoted 
work of the authors. 
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wage premium for working in the public sector for both years. As expected, due to 
the fiscal consolidation measures the premium is higher for 2014 than for 2015, 
and is estimated at 17.4% and 11.3% respectively 13 for these two years.  
To summarize the results of both changes in the unadjusted wage gap between 
the sectors (presented in the Table 2) and changes in the public sector wage 
premium (Table A2), in Table 3 we present the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
results (Eq. 2c). According to the decomposition, the unadjusted gap in wages 
can be split into two parts: 1) the explained part, which is due to differences in 
labour market characteristics between the sectors; and 2) the unexplained gap, 
which is due to the public sector wage premium. 
Table 3: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, 2014 and 2015  
2014  2015  
Average log wages private sector 4.951*** (0.007) 4.975*** (0.006) 
Average log wages public sector 5.274*** (0.007) 5.255*** (0.006) 
Difference – Unadjusted wage gap –0.323*** (0.010) –0.280*** (0.009) 
Explained part –0.148*** (0.008) –0.167*** (0.007) 
Unexplained part –0.174*** (0.009) –0.113*** (0.008) 
Source: Author's calculation based on LFS data (weighted sub-samples).  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
6.1. The unadjusted gap and public sector wage premium in 2014 
The unadjusted gap between the public and private sectors in 2014 stood at 
32.3%.14 Almost half of this difference (about 46%; 14.8% of 32.3%) is due to the 
difference in labour market characteristics between workers from the public and 
the private sector. As mentioned before, compared to the private sector, public 
sector workers are more educated, have longer working experience, more often 
work in better-paid occupations, and have a lower share of temporary contracts 
(Table A1). As these characteristics are associated with higher wages (Table A2), 
                                                            
13  The coefficient from the wage equation is approximately equal to the ceteris paribus 
percentage difference in wages (Cameron & Trivedi 2010).  
14  The difference in log wages is only approximately equal to the percentage difference. Due to this 
approximation the difference in log wages in Table 3 is slightly lower than the calculated 
percentage difference in Table 2; however, the main conclusion of lowering the difference 
between the sectors remains. We comment on the approximate difference to be able to 
simultaneously explain the unadjusted and the adjusted gap in wages and compare their values. 
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part of the difference in average wages can be explained by the fact that on 
average public sector workers have a higher value for their employers simply 
because of their better labour market characteristics.  
Table 4 (column ‘Explained part’ for 2014) indicates that most of the wage 
differences between the sectors can be explained by differences in occupation 
(7.8%), education (5.1%), and working experience (3.1%). Additional significant 
contributions to the explained part are due to differences in shares of temporary 
contracts, part-time work, and settlement. On the other hand, the higher share 
of women and older workers in the public sector increases the gap between the 
sectors. In other words, if the share of women and age of workers in the public 
sector were the same as in the private, the unadjusted differences in wages 
would be even larger. 
When we deduct the part of the gap that is due to differences in labour market 
characteristics from the unadjusted gap, we arrive at an estimate of the public 
sector wage premium. The premium represents the gap between sectors for the 
same job, to the extent that our data allows this comparison, which for 2014 is 
estimated at 17.4%. As already mentioned, if we use estimates from the pooled 
model for the reference coefficients in the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, the 
unexplained part of the gap equals the dummy variable for the public sector in 
the pooled regression (Table A2).  
The column ‘Unexplained part’ in Table 4 analyses the reasons for the public 
sector wage premium. Similarly to the explained part, the largest part of the 
unexplained gap, i.e., the public sector wage premium, is due to higher returns 
to occupation (10.7%), education (9.7%), and working experience (7.1%) in the 
public sector (returns for both sectors can be found in Table A3 in the 
Appendix). In other words, the main reason for the public sector wage premium 
in Serbia is higher rewards for higher levels of education and working 
experience and ‘higher’ occupations. 
On the other hand, negative returns to age, working in rural settlements, and 
temporary contract work are less pronounced in the private sector, which 
attenuates the level of the public sector wage premium. In other words, if the 
returns for these characteristics were equal, the premium would be even higher. 
Furthermore, although the difference in the intercepts in 2014 is not statistically 
significant, there is a large difference of 7.2% that is due to differences in 
unobservables. 
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Table 4: Blinder-Oaxaca detailed decomposition, 2014 and 2015  
Explained part Unexplained part 
2014 2015 2014 2015 
Gender 0.006*** (0.002) 0.005*** (0.002) 0.007 (0.008) 0.006 (0.007) 
Age 0.016*** (0.004) 0.014*** (0.003) 0.114* (0.067) 0.050 (0.052) 
Settlement –0.002*** (0.001) –0.002*** (0.001) 0.026** (0.011) –0.001 (0.009) 
Region -0.000 (0.002) 0.002 (0.001) 0.014 (0.013) –0.020* (0.012) 
Education –0.051*** (0.004) –0.058*** (0.004) –0.097*** (0.027) –0.088*** (0.025) 
Working experience –0.031*** (0.005) –0.036*** (0.004) –0.071** (0.035) –0.010 (0.027) 
Occupation –0.078*** (0.006) –0.080*** (0.005) –0.107*** (0.025) –0.076*** (0.022) 
Part-time –0.002*** (0.001) –0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
Temporary contract –0.006*** (0.001) –0.011*** (0.001) 0.009*** (0.003) 0.007*** (0.002) 
Intercept     –0.072 (0.058) 0.018 (0.050) 
Total –0.148*** (0.008) –0.167*** (0.007) –0.174*** (0.009) –0.113*** (0.008) 
Source: Author's calculation based on LFS data (weighted sub-samples).  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
6.2. Changes in the unadjusted gap and public sector wage premium  
between 2014 and 2015 
The unadjusted gap had a statistically significant15 decrease of 4.3 percentage 
points (from 32.3% to 28.0%) between 2014 and 2015. Although the explained 
part grew from 14.8% to 16.7% (Table 3), this growth was not significant. The 
increase in the share of temporary workers in the private sector (Table A1) has 
marginally (at the 0.1 level) increased the gap due to differences in the share of 
temporary workers, which grew from 0.6% to 1.1%. The increase in the share of 
temporary workers therefore decreased the ‘quality’ of the private sector 
workers even further, so the overall differences in the labour market 
characteristics between the sectors in 2015 are even stronger than in 2014. The 
changes in the other covariates had no significant effect on wage differences.  
Due to the growth (albeit insignificant) of the explained part, the public sector 
wage premium (i.e., the unexplained part of the gap) decreased even more than 
                                                            
15  The statistical significance between the coefficients is tested by comparing the 95% 
confidence intervals for 2014 and 2015. The coefficient decreases significantly if the lower 
bound of the confidence interval for 2014 is higher than the upper bound of the confidence 
interval for 2015. 
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the unadjusted gap, by 6.1 percentage points (from 17.4% to 11.3%). Detailed 
decomposition indicates that the decrease in the public sector wage premium is 
due to the decrease of sector differences in both returns and intercepts (Table 4 
and Table A3). Most prominent among these is the lessening of differences in 
returns to working experience, whose contribution to the total premium 
dropped from 7.1% to the insignificant level of 1%. Additionally, the differences 
in returns to the other two most important contributors to the public sector 
wage premium – occupation and education – also lowered (albeit not 
significantly), from 10.7% to 7.6% and from 9.7% to 8.8%, respectively. Finally, 
although insignificant, the difference between intercepts also lessened (from 
7.2% to –1.8%), indicating that the fiscal consolidation measures cancelled out 
the unobserved advantages of public sector workers.  
Table A4 in Appendix compares the results of the Blinder-Oaxaca and John, 
Murphy, and Peirce (JMP) decompositions. The results show that the residual 
part of the gap in the JMP decomposition is equal to zero, indicating that there 
are no significant differences between the residual distributions of the private 
and the public sector wages. Furthermore, the JMP results confirm the results 
obtained by the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. According to JMP estimates the 
public sector wage premium dropped even more, by 7.6 percentage points (from 
18.8% to 11.2%). Bearing in mind that the differences in residual distribution 
are not significant, the differences between the Blinder-Oaxaca and JMP 
estimates stem from using different approaches to calculate the explained and 
unexplained parts of the gap. 
7. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates the effect of fiscal consolidation measures on the size 
and distribution of the public sector wage premium in Serbia. The measures 
included a 10% cut in public sector wages and a subsequent wage freeze until 
the end of 2017. We investigate the effects of the measures by estimating the 
public sector wage premium for two years, 2014 and 2015 – before and after the 
measures were introduced.  
The results show that public sector wages in Serbia are on average higher than in 
the private sector. Approximately half of the difference in wages in 2014 was due 
to the better labour market characteristics of public sector workers, mainly 
higher levels of education and more frequent work in better paid occupations. 
In 2015 the difference in average wages had reduced (from about 32% to 28%), 
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while the difference in labour market characteristics had slightly increased. The 
increase was mainly due to a higher share of temporary workers in the private 
sector, which decreased the quality of work. The relative stagnation of workers’ 
educational and occupational structure indicates that although the number of 
public sector workers decreased, this was probably due to restrictions on 
employment as a result of fiscal consolidation rather than shifts from the public 
to the private sector.  
The results also show that the public sector wage premium in Serbia in 2014 was 
very high, 17.4%, indicating a large wage difference between private and public 
sectors even after controlling for differences in labour market characteristics. 
The estimated premium is similar to that in a recent paper (Vladisavljević and 
Jovančević 2016) for 2013 based on EU-SILC data, thus additionally validating 
the result. Most of the premium can be explained by higher returns to 
education, occupation, and working experience in the public sector, which 
indicates that the public sector rewards these characteristics more generously 
than the private sector.  
In 2015, after the fiscal consolidation measures were introduced, the premium 
dropped by an average of 6.1 percentage points. This result indicates a decrease 
in wage inequality between public and private sectors. Most of the decrease is 
due to less difference in returns to working experience, reflecting the nature of 
the reform. As mentioned in the introduction, the lowest wages in the public 
sector were exempted from the wage cut. As returns to working experience are 
positive, people with high levels of working experience have a greater likelihood 
of higher wages and therefore are more likely to be hit by the fiscal 
consolidation measures. Therefore, the returns to working experience became 
lower in the public sector while remaining unchanged in the private sector. 
Similar changes occurred in returns to occupation and education, although their 
effect on the public sector wage premium was insignificant. 
This research has shown that before fiscal consolidation measures were 
introduced in Serbia there was a large public sector wage premium. Together 
with higher job security in the public sector, the premium created a strong 
duality between private and public sectors and caused a ‘waiting-in-line’ effect 
for jobs in the public sector, while leaving the private sector with workers of 
lower quality. Thus, beside fiscal effects, the cut in public sector wages had the 
positive effect of lowering both inequality between the sectors and overall wage 
inequality.  
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APPENDIX  
Table A1: Estimation sample descriptive statistics 
var 
Private 
sector 
2014 
Public 
sector 
2014 
sig 
Private 
sector 
2015 
Public 
sector 
2015 
sig 
Sign. of change 
between the years 
Private Public 
Female 0.445 0.485 *** 0.459 0.495 *** * 
Age 39.747 44.8 *** 40.085 45.3 *** ** *** 
Without degree 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 * * 
Primary 0.089 0.074 *** 0.091 0.083 * ** 
Secondary (2–3 years) 0.308 0.175 *** 0.302 0.153 *** *** 
Secondary (4 years) 0.432 0.396 *** 0.431 0.394 *** 
Tertiary (1–3 years) 0.059 0.086 *** 0.06 0.09 *** 
Tertiary (BA, MA, PhD) 0.108 0.266 *** 0.112 0.277 *** 
Belgrade 0.199 0.236 *** 0.205 0.226 *** 
Vojvodina  0.295 0.217 *** 0.293 0.224 *** 
West Serbia 0.284 0.274 0.282 0.295 * *** 
East Serbia 0.222 0.273 *** 0.22 0.255 *** ** 
Urban 0.61 0.654 *** 0.603 0.654 *** 
Working experience 14.9 20.1 *** 14.9 20.7 *** *** 
Senior officials and 
managers 0.017 0.027 *** 0.016 0.024 *** 
Professionals 0.06 0.265 *** 0.057 0.272 *** 
Technicians and ass. 
profess. 0.121 0.204 *** 0.104 0.205 *** *** 
Clerks 0.088 0.112 *** 0.089 0.102 *** ** 
Service and sales workers 0.269 0.11 *** 0.281 0.118 *** * 
Craft and trade workers 0.208 0.091 *** 0.204 0.084 *** 
Plant and machine 
operators 0.165 0.08 *** 0.173 0.076 *** 
Elementary occupations 0.072 0.111 *** 0.077 0.12 *** 
Part-time 0.008 0.018 *** 0.014 0.017 * *** 
Temporary contract 0.154 0.082 *** 0.193 0.091 *** *** * 
7,642 7,054 9,680 8,322 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,  
Significance test performed on the basis of t-test for independent samples. Standard errors, t-
statistics, and exact p-values omitted from the table, available upon request from the author.  
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Table A2: Ordinary least squares estimates  
2014 2015 
Public sector 0.174*** (0.009) 0.113*** (0.008) 
Gender –0.143*** (0.008) –0.136*** (0.007) 
Age –0.003*** (0.001) –0.003*** (0.001) 
Settlement 0.051*** (0.008) 0.041*** (0.007) 
Belgrade (omitted) 
Vojvodina –0.082*** (0.011) –0.096*** (0.010) 
West Serbia –0.134*** (0.011) –0.128*** (0.010) 
East Serbia –0.145*** (0.012) –0.161*** (0.010) 
Primary or no education (omitted) 
Secondary (2–3 years) 0.037** (0.015) 0.074*** (0.013) 
Secondary (4 years) 0.114*** (0.015) 0.149*** (0.013) 
Tertiary (1–3 years) 0.181*** (0.021) 0.223*** (0.018) 
Tertiary (BA, MA, PhD) 0.358*** (0.021) 0.421*** (0.018) 
Working experience 0.013*** (0.002) 0.012*** (0.001) 
Working experience squared –0.000*** (0.000) –0.000*** (0.000) 
Senior officials and managers 0.497*** (0.032) 0.376*** (0.031) 
Professionals 0.415*** (0.020) 0.337*** (0.017) 
Technicians and ass. professionals 0.312*** (0.017) 0.263*** (0.014) 
Clerks 0.244*** (0.017) 0.182*** (0.015) 
Service and sales workers 0.040*** (0.015) –0.013 (0.012) 
Craft and trade workers 0.163*** (0.017) 0.101*** (0.014) 
Plant and machine operators 0.182*** (0.017) 0.143*** (0.014) 
Elementary occupations (omitted) 
Part-time 0.174*** (0.045) 0.198*** (0.029) 
Temporary contract –0.092*** (0.011) –0.115*** (0.010) 
Constant 4.782*** (0.030) 4.837*** (0.026) 
Observations 14,696 18,002 
Adjusted R-squared 0.480 0.480 
F 337.0 387.9 
p 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3: Ordinary least squares estimates of the separate models for public 
and private sectors  
Public 2014 Private 2014 Public 2015 Private 2015 
Gender -0.140*** (0.012) -0.124*** (0.012) -0.129*** (0.011) -0.115*** (0.010) 
Age -0.005*** (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.002** (0.001) 
Settlement 0.032*** (0.012) 0.071*** (0.011) 0.042*** (0.009) 0.041*** (0.009) 
Belgrade (omitted)     
Vojvodina -0.103*** (0.014) -0.059*** (0.016) -0.086*** (0.013) -0.098*** (0.014) 
West Serbia -0.147*** (0.015) -0.120*** (0.015) -0.108*** (0.012) -0.134*** (0.014) 
East Serbia -0.132*** (0.016) -0.159*** (0.016) -0.131*** (0.013) -0.175*** (0.015) 
Primary or no 
education (omitted)     
    
Secondary (2–3 years) 0.046* (0.024) 0.020 (0.019) 0.089*** (0.024) 0.055*** (0.016) 
Secondary (4 years) 0.171*** (0.024) 0.064*** (0.019) 0.201*** (0.024) 0.109*** (0.016) 
Tertiary (1–3 years) 0.238*** (0.029) 0.136*** (0.030) 0.283*** (0.027) 0.177*** (0.028) 
Tertiary (BA, MA, 
PhD) 
0.451*** (0.028) 0.259*** (0.030) 0.505*** (0.027) 0.344*** (0.027) 
Working experience 0.015*** (0.003) 0.011*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.002) 0.013*** (0.002) 
Working experience 
squared 
-0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 
Senior officials and 
managers 
0.499*** (0.044) 0.444*** (0.049) 0.423*** (0.034) 0.297*** (0.054) 
Professionals 0.409*** (0.024) 0.420*** (0.039) 0.310*** (0.022) 0.413*** (0.035) 
Technicians and ass. 
professionals 
0.315*** (0.023) 0.269*** (0.025) 0.262*** (0.019) 0.246*** (0.024) 
Clerks 0.279*** (0.023) 0.160*** (0.025) 0.202*** (0.021) 0.133*** (0.022) 
Service and sales 
workers 
0.158*** (0.025) -0.075*** (0.019) 0.114*** (0.021) -0.102*** (0.016) 
Craft and trade workers 0.236*** (0.030) 0.067*** (0.021) 0.221*** (0.028) 0.018 (0.018) 
Plant and machine 
operators 
0.265*** (0.029) 0.082*** (0.021) 0.194*** (0.025) 0.084*** (0.019) 
Elem. occup. (omitted)     
Part-time 0.142*** (0.043) 0.249*** (0.096) 0.189*** (0.037) 0.211*** (0.045) 
Temporary contract -0.138*** (0.019) -0.062*** (0.014) -0.151*** (0.016) -0.096*** (0.012) 
Constant 4.920*** (0.044) 4.849*** (0.039) 4.877*** (0.037) 4.895*** (0.034) 
Observations 7,054 7,642 8,322  9,680  
Adjusted R-squared 0.459 0.365 0.488  0.388  
F 154.2 79.98 196.2  102.6  
p 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4: Comparison of the Blinder-Oaxaca and John, Murphy and Pierce 
(JMP) decompositions. 
Blinder-Oaxaca JMP 
2014 2015 2014 2015 
Unexplained part 0.174 0.113 0.188 0.112 
Explained part 0.149 0.167 0.134 0.168 
Residual effect - - 0.000 0.000 
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